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ARTICLES
UTOPIAN VISIONS: COOPERATION WITHOUT
CONFLICTS IN PUBLIC/PRIVATE VENTURES
Judith Welch Wegner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of cooperative ventures' involving local
governments and private businesses is a fascinating and prom-
ising development. For planners, ventures such as San Diego's
Horton Plaza or St. Paul's Town Square may provide Utopian
solutions to intransigent problems of urban deterioration. For
economists, these ventures provide proof that non-regulatory
solutions to pressing urban problems are possible, and vindi-
© 1990 by Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C. This article is based on
an essay, Utopian Visions: Cooperation without Conflicts in Public/Private Ventures, first
published in CITY DEAL MAKING (Urban Land Institute 1990). It is reprinted with
permission.
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J.D., U.C.L.A., 1976; B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972. The author
wishes to express her thanks to participants in the forum on "Public-Private
Conflicts" sponsored by the Urban Land Institute in September 1988. Their
experiences and ideas stimulated her thinking and broadened her experience with
the practical aspects of such ventures. She also wishes to acknowledge the helpful
research assistance provided by Lori Nelson, J.D., 1989, University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law, and the insightful criticisms and ideas shared
by Frayda Bluestein, J.D., 1986, University of California at Davis.
1. The term "cooperative ventures" is used here to refer to a wide range of
collaborative ventures involving public and private parties. The terms 'joint ven-
ture" and "partnership" are deliberately avoided because of ihe common usage of
those words, as legal terms of art, signify more extensive obligations between
public and private partners than are typically envisioned or desired in carefully
circumscribed public-private venture agreements. See generally A. BROMBERG & L.
RIBSTEIN, ON PARTNERSHIP (1988); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND
BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 189-95 (1968).
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cate recent federal budgetary decisions to leave states and
localities more and more on their own to explore creative
financing methods designed to meet localized needs. For polit-
ical scientists and historians, such public-private partnerships
present a fascinating image of corporate lions lying down with
municipal lambs (or vice versa, depending on one's point of
view). For lawyers, this development poses many questions that
are left unanswered-first, is there or should there be a funda-
mental distinction between public and private entities, and
second, how are they to be treated under the law? There exists
a grave possibility that pragmatic solutions may only confound
the puzzlement of theoreticians.
2
Richard Babcock's provocative essay entitled "The City as
Entrepreneur: Fiscal Wisdom or Regulatory Folly?' acknowledges
the splendor of such visions, but injects a healthy dose of reali-
ty into the picture. He poses a central question and presents a
critical challenge to proponents of "municipal entrepreneur-
ship:" do cooperative ventures of the sort presently emerging
create a fundamental conflict of interest for government partic-
ipants either because of tensions between their interests and
those of their private partners, or because of incompatibility
between their own dual roles of entrepreneur and regulator?
This essay accepts that challenge and seeks to carry the discus-
sion a step or two further both by probing the precise extent
to which conflicts of interest may threaten the Utopian vision,
and by exploring the ways in which the development of appro-
priate legal principles and institutional mechanisms may put
fears of potential conflicts of interest to rest.
An important initial step in addressing the existence of
potential conflicts of interest involves understanding precisely
what is meant by that term. "Conflict of interest" is sometimes
used as an epithet to condemn immoral or improper conduct.
Matthew's Biblical caution embodies the depth of this concern:
"No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the
one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and
2. See, e.g., Symposium on the Public-Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1289-95 (1982); Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in Ameri-
can Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 225 (1985).
3. Babcock, The City as Entrepreneur: Fiscal Wisdom or Regulatory Folly?, 29
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 931 (1989).
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despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon."4
This essay reflects a fundamentally more hopeful or at
least less pessimistic view concerning problems of potential
conflicts of interest for local government participants in coop-
erative ventures. It assumes that "conflict of interest" means
nothing more than the existence of competing interests or
concerns between parties or within a single party. It suggests
that in the face of such competing concerns, a range of re-
sponses is possible-avoiding situations that give rise to a prob-
lematic tension is one possibility, but alternative approaches
also exist. Such approaches include the development of appro-
priate mechanisms and principles for determining which of the
competing concerns should prevail or how both might be ac-
commodated. Finally, it recognizes that a cooperative venture
or other relationship has a number of specific facets which
give rise to distinctive sets of competing interests and appro-
priate responses.
This paper therefore proceeds by identifying a number of
key facets of cooperative ventures which serve as focal points
for discussion. These key features include (1) a local
government's capacity to enter such an agreement, (2) the
parties in interest, (3) the process by which agreement is
reached, (4) the purposes underlying the agreement, (5) the
"coinage" a government may use in the transaction, and (6)
problems of noncompliance.
*The essay proceeds systematically to examine each of
these facets of public-private agreements, by identifying and
describing the relevant competing interests, discussing and
evaluating established legal doctrine that provides guidance
regarding possible responses to the tensions that exist, and
suggesting additional or alternative legal and institutional
mechanisms that can be brought into play to achieve desired
results in the face of competing concerns. In this way, it at-
tempts to place specters of conflicting interests to rest, so that
Utopian visions may flourish undisturbed.
II. GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY
Several competing interests may influence judgments con-
cerning a government's capacity to enter into cooperative yen-
4. Matthew 6:24.
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tures. The question of government capacity is not a new one,
or one limited to this particular context. The debate in recent
years has been openly framed in terms of interests in city pow-
er or powerlessness. Professor Gerald Frug has urged that cit-
ies need additional power in order to deal with local problems
and to facilitate decentralized democracy.5 He has also argued,
however, that the current legal system denies cities expansive
powers because of the liberal tradition's concentration of pow-
er at the state level in order to protect the rights of individual
citizens.' Professor Robert Ellickson has maintained that cities,
in fact, have too much power, and that such power may ad-
versely affect the functioning of the marketplace and individual
freedom.7 Professor Joan Williams has observed that the cur-
rent legal regime limiting city power may have been intended,
in particular, to foster the concerns of private property owners
to maintain their economic interests.' Finally, Professor
Hendrick Hartog has documented patterns of state interven-
tion in order to limit city power, and public sentiment relegat-
ing New York City to the governmental role rather than the
proprietary role.9 In essence, then, these commentators have
described and documented key competing interests which bear
on cities' capacity to undertake novel roles: the interest in
allowing local initiative to solve pressing problems perceived by
local constituents, and the countervailing pressure to maximize
individual and market autonomy and maintain private property
rights free from government intervention.
Additional concerns are evident with regard to coopera-
tive ventures. Cities typically enter such ventures in order to
achieve particularized goals including the achievement of
sound planning objectives, the furtherance of urban renewal
not otherwise possible, or the procurement of necessary public
infrastructure. On the other hand, such ventures carry poten-
tial risks of financial overextension or failure, as well as market
5. See Frug, The City as Legal Concept, 93 IIARV. L. REV. 1059, 1120-54
(1980).
6. Id. at 1074-80.
7. See Ellickson, Cities and lo-omeowneps Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1573-77 (1982).
8. See Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government:
The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 83, 90-100 (1986).
9. See H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORA-
TION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW (1983).
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distortion.
The existing legal framework reflects the longstanding tug-
of-war between concerns for city power and interests in city
powerlessness. The courts in a number of states continue to
apply "Dillon's Rule," a nineteenth century formulation that
provides that "a local government entity can possess and exer-
cise those powers granted in express words; those powers nec-
essarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; and those powers essential to the accomplishment of
the declared objects and purposes .... . Some state courts,
legislatures, or constitutions have in recent years adopted a
more expansive view of local government powers and a more
generous interpretive view." "Home rule" authority has been
made available to local governments in many states, but has
been vigorously pursued in comparatively few.'" Local charter
amendments are likely to be required before broad home rule
powers can be asserted in any event. Particularly stringent
approaches are often brought to bear in determining the ca-
pacity of local governments to take initiatives involving finan-
cial matters.'s
Although the legal framework just described reflects many
years of effort to forge an appropriate balance between com-
10. See 2 C. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 13.05, at
13-21 (1982) (quoting Dillon's Rule); 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
10.09 n.7 (3d ed. rev. 1979) (citing cases from 46 states).
11. See, e.g., Liberati v. Bristol Bay Borough, 584 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1978);
Osborne v. State, 439 N.E.2d 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Tipco Corp. v. City of
Billings, 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074 (1982); State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116(Utah 1980). See also IOWA CONST. art. Il1, § 38A (municipal power not limited to
.only those powers granted in express words"); MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 34("[p]rovisions of this constitution and law concerning counties [and] cities...
shall be liberally construed . . . ").
12. See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 269, 277, 282 (1968). See also 1 C. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW § 4.02 nn.2-3, § 4.05 (listing constitutional and statutory provi-
sions). Grants of "home rule" power to counties and municipalities are intended
to delegate autonomous power to local governments in order to allow them to
take initiatives with regard to local affairs and in order to give them some protec-
tion from the encroachment of state legislatures. See D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCII,
P. SALSICH & J. WEGNER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
110-11 (3d ed. 1990); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203
S.W.2d 438 (1947) (city charter did not confer power to levy municipal income
tax).
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peting concerns about local governments' capacity to under-
take creative initiatives, it is unlikely to provide an adequate re-
sponse to the problem of government capacity in the particu-
lar context at hand. It may be difficult for the question of gov-
ernment capacity to reach the courts or to be presented at a
time when judicial intervention could do much good. As dis-
cussed in part III, citizens at large or even those particularly
affected by a cooperative venture may face problems in estab-
lishing standing. Government or private partners who might be
given standing to assert such a claim are likely to do so only as
a way of excusing noncompliance with contractual obligations
at a later date.
Absent legislative action to afford explicit authority for
certain types of cooperative ventures, courts may confront
difficult questions of interpretation before resolving debates
about governmental capacity in any event.'
4 Even then, the
critical question remains unanswered-while local governments
in general may be authorized to undertake any type of cooper-
ative venture, is the particular government involved sufficiently
sophisticated and otherwise adequately equipped?
The legal scheme, therefore, needs amendment to ensure
that questions of government capacity are indeed addressed, in
a fact-specific and timely way, by those with appropriate exper-
tise. Explicit legislation is needed, as was recognized by states
which recently approved the use of development agree-
ments, 5 in order to permit a careful weighing of general con-
cerns relating to appropriate types of cooperative ventures and
their terms. Key features of such legislation are provisions
which address the question of government capacity and how it
is to be determined prior to commencement of a cooperative
venture. Several options are possible. A state-level local govern-
ment commission could be empowered to review proposed fi-
nancial arrangements.' Provision could be made for the as-
14. See, e.g., Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz, 179 Cal. App. 3d 814, 225
Cal. Rptr. 43 (1986) (discussing agricultural land preservation agreement), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 803 (1986). See generally Wegner, Movitig Toward the Baigaining Ta-
ble: Contract Zoning. Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations 
of Govern-
ment Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L. REv. 957, 1006-07 (1987) (discussing cases involv-
ing authority for government agreements).
15. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-69.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 46-121 to -132 (1985). See generally Wegner, supra note 14, at
994-99.
16. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-3, -51, -149 (1987 & Snpp. 1990) (establishing
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signment of experienced staff to work closely with a local gov-
ernment undertaking a sophisticated venture. Alternatively, a
public referendum 7 could be authorized to ensure that the
local government and its citizens have carefully weighed com-
peting concerns before commencing a potentially beneficial
but also novel and possibly risky undertaking.
III. PARTIES IN INTEREST
Competing interests also exist regarding the conceptualiza-
tion of a cooperative venture as a simple contract involving a
public and a private party. The simplicity of this approach has
many positive aspects from the standpoint of the principal par-
ties-it minimizes time consuming debate with others such as
neighbors, competitors, and citizens at large who appear to
have more marginal interests, and limits associated costs of the
transaction and project implementation. It also preserves the
government party's considerable stake in maintaining its legiti-
macy by appearing (and acting) to represent the interests of all
its citizens-in short, representing not only its institutional
interests, but also the interests of "the public." The public is
composed of citizens at large, as well as persons with more
particularized interests such as neighbors or entrepreneurs.
At the same time, however, citizens may perceive a poten-
tial variance between the government's institutional interests
and the interests of the citizenry as a whole. This may be par-
ticularly true where fiscal concerns, a desire to improve munic-
ipal infrastructure, or visionary planning goals motivate gov-
ernment participation, while many citizens lack information
about or appreciation for such matters, are content with the
status quo, and place different values on competing environ-
mental and financial considerations. Certain segments of the
public are particularly apt to voice specific concerns-those
state-level local government commission charged with reviewing local governments'
borrowing proposals). This option of a state-level local government commission to
review proposed financial arrangements has been implemented in various states.
Cf also Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. l.J. 647, 691(1986) (suggesting use of state-level agency to provide protection against unfairness
that might result if delegation to private parties of certain tradilional governmental
functions resulted in abuse of power for private interests).
17. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65867.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (declar-
ing such development agreement a legislative act subject to referendum).
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who live close to the site of the projected development, and
those whose business interests may be affected. Neighbors may
feel that a cooperative venture involving a local government
puts that government in a novel posture. It is not simply react-
ing to someone else's development proposal as a neutral
decisionmaker, but is instead initiating its own develop-
ment-an action that may arguably trigger enhanced responsi-
bilities to those immediately affected. Competitors may fear
that they will not be given a fair chance to compete for
government-sponsored opportunities, or that their businesses
will suffer from government action affecting the market, per-
haps in unfair ways.
The existing legal framework affords citizens, neighbors,
and competitors a relatively limited opportunity to ensure that
their concerns are recognized. They are given opportunities to
assert their interests through procedural mechanisms designed
to channel their comments into local government
decision-making, as described in part IV below. Absent success-
ful assertion of those concerns in that setting, however, they
must turn to the courts and use the threat of litigation as lever-
age to claim a more significant role in a given cooperative
venture.
Success in litigation is likely to turn upon facts and theo-
ries in individual cases, but two broad themes deserve mention
here. First, a question may exist as to whether citizens, neigh-
bors or competitors have standing-in other words, whether
there exists a sufficiently concrete link between their personal
claim and the challenged government action to convince a
court that the litigant is entitled to judicial review.' The law
of standing varies in subtle respects from state to state. Courts
may afford citizens standing only upon a showing that they
have suffered a discernible injury. In some cases, the injury to
18. See, e.g., Hotels of Distinction West, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 107
N.M. 257, 755 P.2d 595 (1988) (competitor hotel lacked standing to challenge city
agreement to participate in a cooperative venture for the development of a con-
vention center, on the grounds that the city had violated requirements of an af-
firmative action ordinance. State law required the complainant to be injured in
fact or imminently threatened with economic or other injury but the city's alleged
violation did not adversely affect the competitor); Cheape v. Town of Chapel liill,
320 N.C. 549, 359 S.E.2d 792 (1987) (noting the necessity of proof that plaintiffs
had been injuriously affected in their persons, property or constitutional rights,
but assuming alleged facts for procedural purposes).
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the individual must be distinct from that suffered by the public
at large.' 9 Many states, by statute, allow taxpayer suits against
local governments. However, they may qualify such a right to
sue by requiring the taxpayer to demonstrate that a property
or pecuniary interest is affected, that expenditure of local
funds has in fact been involved, and that a sound legal theory
exists that does more than simply question the wisdom of the
government's action.2" More stringent rules may further limit
standing to challenge land use decisions. Only those who can
demonstrate that they have suffered special injury or damage
(such as nearby landowners) typically can challenge adverse
rezoning or permit decisions. 2' Adverse effects on the busi-
ness of a competitor have not sufficed to establish standing for
such purposes.
22
Second, even if standing is established, it may be difficult
to devise a tenable legal theory that would allow challengers
the opportunity to prevail. If a rezoning or permit application
is involved, procedural requirements must be followed and
substantive standards satisfied. Such standards may require
that rezoning comport with a comprehensive overall plan for
local land use regulation, weigh relevant facts and policy con-
siderations, account for changed circumstances, or follow ordi-
nance provisions regarding the grounds for denial of permits
or imposition of conditions.23 The decisions in such cases are
19. See, e.g., Tabor v. Moore, 81 Wash. 2d 613, 503 P.2d 736 (1972) (denying
standing to taxpayers who failed to show direct, special or pecuniary interest in
the outcome of an action challenging police procedures). See also 6 E. MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 20.19 (3d rev. ed. 1988) ("a citizen or taxpayer,
without pecuniary or property interest that is affected by the enforcement of an
ordinance is not a proper party to institute a proceeding to determine the validity
of the ordinance or to restrain its enforcement on the ground of its invalidity, at
least where the case is not one involving a civic responsibility authorizing, under
the law of the particular jurisdiction, a citizen or taxpayer to institute the proceed-
ing"); 18 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 52.14 (3d rev. ed. 1984) (dis-
cussing special injury rule in taxpayer suits).
20. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 12, at 747-61 (discussing case law); 18 E.
MCQUILLIN, supra- note 19, §§ 52.05-52.06d (describing state statutes); id. § 52.13
(discussing pecuniary interest rule); id. §§ 52.28-.34 (discussing standing in cases
involving exceeding debt limits, unlawful expenditures, antI improper levy of
taxes); id. §§ 52.36-.38 (discussing standing in cases involving misuse or sale of
municipal property); id. §§ 52.24-.26 (discussing cases involving contracts); id. §
52.21 (discussing cases indicating absence of standing to challenge discretionary
acts).
21. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 8.02-.07 (2d ed. 1988).
22. See e.g., Copple v. City of Lincoln, 210 Nei). 504, 315 N.W.2d 628 (1982).
23. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 21, §§ 6.23-.34, 6.49-.57; Wegner, supra
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often unpredictable or deferential to government action grant-
ing a permit.24 On the other hand, efforts by local govern-
ments to impose mitigating conditions on rezoning in order to
accommodate neighbors' concerns may be rebuffed. 5 While
anticompetitive behavior may at times be challenged under
zoning or antitrust laws, the difficulties of proving such behav-
ior may be insurmountable.
26
When a rezoning or permit application is not required,
and the proposed venture instead involves simply a sale of
government property, the use of eminent domain powers or
government funding, the available theories for challenging
government action may be even more sparse and inapposite to
the policy concerns driving citizen litigation. For example, in
one recent case, neighbors challenged a city's sale of air rights
over municipally-owned land in order to facilitate an urban
renewal project including a new parking facility, hotel, and
retail shops.27 Their principal concerns related to traffic con-
gestion and environmental impacts on nearby neighborhoods.
Since the existence of local legislation authorizing the project
foreclosed a challenge to the city's capacity or purpose, only
weak arguments were stated such as a charge of procedural
error, an unpersuasive claim that the project involved "regula-
tion of trade," and an unsuccessful assertion that it constituted
an impermissible joint venture. 28
The existing legal system thus limits the opportunities for
assertion of citizen, neighbor and competitor concerns. If
these concerns are to be accorded greater recognition and
legitimacy, and if additional safeguards are desirable to mini-
mize risks associated with governments' performance of multi-
ple roles, then the legal system requires modification. Several
solutions warrant consideration.
More appropriate procedural mechanisms can be created
to identify and address neighbors' and the public's concerns at
note 14, at 986-92.
24. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 21, §§ 6.24, .25, .52.
25. 25. See Wegner, supra note 14, at 982-92 (discussing contingent zoning).
26. See, e.g., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Cirardeau, 693 F.2d 733
(8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); remanded for new trial, 794 F.2d
330 (8th Cir. 1986), 804 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987)
(challenging zoning decision under antitrust laws).
27. See Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 359 S.E.2d 792 (1987).
28. Id. at 550-51, 359 S.E.2d at 793-94.
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an early phase of project development. Care can also be taken
in the development of appropriate bidding procedures to en-
sure that opportunities to participate in government funding
are allocated on equitable grounds. Finally, adequate standards
and appropriate remedies can be formulated to ensure that
the overall interest of the public is not compromised. Such
standards and remedies are described in parts VI and VII.
IV. PROCESS
Use of appropriate decision-making processes seems to be
the very essence of law. It is worth remembering, however,
that competing concerns may shape the precise sort of process
adopted to govern decision-making in a given context. Tradi-
tionally, concerns for openness and orderliness have justified
incorporation of detailed procedural requirements as subse-
quently discussed. 9 Openness and orderliness are in turn as-
sumed to ensure the availability of adequate information and
to stimulate fairness instead of favoritism in
decision-making."0 Potentially competing concerns may come
into play when business ventures are involved. In that context,
there may be a premium on confidentiality in order to forestall
increased business costs, and on swift and flexible
decision-making in order to capture elusive opportunities.
The legal system recognizes that many types of govern-
ment action that may give rise to the deprivation of property
rights must be accomplished by following certain procedures
that afford "due process.""' The process that is due varies
with the circumstances, although some form of notice and
hearing at an appropriate time is typically required where ad-
ministrative action is taken.3" State statutes specify the situa-
tions in which procedural protections are afforded and often
go beyond constitutional requirements in establishing rules
applicable to legislative action as well. 3 Decisions involving
29. See infra notes 30-42.
30. See M. Shultz & J. Groy, Land Use Decision-Making. Legislative or
Quasi-Judicial Action, 18 COLO. LAw. 241 (1989). See also inf a notes 49-50 and
accompanying text.
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall . . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
32. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U:S. 319 (1976).
33. See infra notes 34, 36.
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exercise of the police power (such as rezoning or land use per-
mitting decisions) typically are reached after the public and
particularly affected landowners receive notice and an opportu-
nity to participate in a hearing before the relevant local gov-
ernment board. 4 Recent statutes in states allowing use of "de-
velopment agreements"" have included similar notice and
hearing provisions.36 Other government powers such as the
power to tax or borrow money may trigger notice and hearing
requirements under relevant statutes. Not all government con-
tracts may be subject to such provisions, however.
3 7
Additional procedural requirements may apply depending
upon the particular jurisdiction. Specialized provisions exist in
a number of states which require development of environmen-
tal impact statements before certain kinds of discretionary
action are commenced by government agencies."8 Local con-
tracts may be restricted by state laws governing bidding proce-
dures.39 Open meetings laws4° may influence the extent to
which negotiations can take place in private and who may be
involved.4 Certain government actions may also be subject to
34. See Standard Zoning Enabling Act § 4 (providing for notice and hearing
in connection with zoning changes), reptinted in MODEl. I-AND DEV. CODE § 210
(Tent. Draft No: 1 1968); F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, HANDLING THE
LAND USE CASE § 3.1.2.b (1984) (quasi-judicial proceedings).
35. Development agreements are a means of establishing clear understandings
concerning the vested rights of developers to rely on existing land use regulations
for a set period of time in return for contributions to community infrastructure
and other public goals.
36. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. §
163-3225 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-128 (1988).
37. See 10 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.18 (3d rev. ed.
1990) (listing conditions precedent to making contract, including vote of electorate
in some situations).
38. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21082 (West 1986). See also Renz, The
Coming of Age of State Environmental Policy Acts, 5 PUB. IAND L. REV. 31 (1984).
39. See 10 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 37, §§ 29.28-.90 (extensive discussion of
state laws on competitive bidding).
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.9 (1990) ("Whereas the public bodies that
administer the legislative, policymaking, quasi-judicial, administrative, and advisory
functions of North Carolina and its political subdivisions exist solely to conduct
the people's business, it is tile public policy of North Carolina that the hearings,
deliberations, and actions of these bodies. be conducted openly."). See also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-318.10 (1990) ("[Elach official meeting of a public body shall be
open to the public, and any person is entitled to attend such a meeting."). See
gene-ally 4 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 13.07 (3d rev. ed. 1985)
(meetings of council); id. §§ 13.07a-c (public meeting laws and requirements
generally).
41. See genemlly 0. REYNOLDS, HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT L.W § 63
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public referenda; for example, development agreements in
California may be challenged by such means, although those in
Hawaii may not.42
The existing legal system has developed fairly straightfor-
ward mechanisms for providing public comment prior to final-
ization of government decisions.. Limited refinement most
likely is all that is needed in adapting the established notice
and hearing practices for use in the context of cooperative
ventures. For example, it is advisable, at least as a policy mat-
ter, that such procedures be followed whenever a major coop-
erative venture is undertaken, even if there is no constitutional
mandate to that effect. Care must also be exercised in defining
the scope and timing of the hearing so that it pertains to the
project as a whole at an early point. A hearing must allow for
consideration of all relevant information (such as that found in
environmental studies), rather than adopting an ill-timed,
piecemeal approach to related decisions.43 The application of
referendum provisions existing in certain states must be clari-
fied.44
In certain other respects, however, the existing legal
scheme needs modification. Clearly, it does not completely
treat the process by which public-private deals are developed.
Rather, the existing legal system focuses on how these deals
are finalized. Much more thought is needed in order to shape
the deal-development process so that it addresses concerns
regarding the need for information, fairness, confidentiality,
and flexibility. The most salient ideas are likely to be provided
by those who have been most intimately involved in the formu-
lation of these public-private deals.
Some brief preliminary thoughts may nevertheless be ap-
propriate. First, the process of initial pairing of public and
private partners is a clumsy one. Some jurisdictions have used
requests for proposals to identify potential private partners
either because of governing legal requirements or a concern
(1982); Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In! Open-Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to
Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480 (1973).
42. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) with
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-131 (1988).
43. See e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE § 65867 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (providing
for concurrent hearing on development agreement and related permits).,
44. See generally Wegner, supra note 14, at 1010-14 (discussing applicability of
referenda provisions in land use decision making).
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for fairness to all potential bidders.45 This mechanism may be
problematic, however, if a private party conceives a project and
takes the initiative, or if exceptional circumstances dictate a
less formal process. Second, the deal-development process fails
to afford an appropriate role to neighbors and others who may
be adversely affected by a proposed project.4 6 Early identifica-
tion and consideration of the concerns of those likely to be
affected can prove more efficient if it will be necessary to ad-
dress those concerns in the end. There is a growing body of
literature describing ways in which neighbors can be brought
into public-private negotiations,4 7 although formal legal mech-
anisms to assure such involvement are still in the embryonic
stage. Finally, the public's interest in ensuring that adequate
information is provided need not be effected, at the
deal-development, stage, by elaborate hearings or open meet-
ings. Instead, that interest may be served by the introduction
of expert personnel as part of the local government's negotiat-
ing team.48 One possible approach to procuring such exper-
tise would be to staff state or regional government agencies
with at least one professional who would be able to consult or
participate with local governments in negotiations as necessary.
Another novel aspect of the process applicable to coopera-
tive ventures may also be worthy of note. In contrast to land
use decisions, which typically involve only initial review by local
government agencies, cooperative ventures involve long-term
commitments and ongoing relationships. Such projects may
extend over several years, may need to weather changes in the
45. Some jurisdictions require that governments give notice of their intent to
contract for certain services or engage in joint undertakings, in order to allow all
interested private parties an opportunity to submit proposals for review and possi-
ble selection by the government. See Hotels of Distinction West, Inc. v. City of
Albuquerque, 107 N.M. 257, 755 P.2d 595 (1988) (involving development
agreement for the addition of a first-class hotel to a convention center); Municpal
Art Society v. City of New York, 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1987)
(coliseum site offered for sale by public authority pursuant to a request for pro-
posals).
46. Costonis, Tinker to Evers to Chance: Community Groups as the Third Player
in the Development Game, in CITY DEAL MAKING 155-66 (Urban Land Institute,
1990). This failure to afford an appropriate role to those potentially affected by a
proposed project is discussed elsewhere in this article.
47. See, e.g., L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1987).
48. Cf Lawrence, supra note 16, at 693 (discussing use of specially qualified
decision maker).
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economy and the political climate, and may involve hard times
as well as good times.49 It is therefore advisable to anticipate
that modifications in the agreement embodying a
public-private venture or review of such a project may be re-
quired and to provide for a satisfactory process for modifica-
tion if that becomes necessary. Development agreement stat-
utes take precisely this tack, by specifying that periodic reviews
are required, that agreements are to span no more than five
years unless agreed to by both parties, and that hearings are to
be held in the event of modification.5 ° This sort of arrange-
ment both protects the local government's prerogative and
obligation to gather information on an ongoing basis, and
instills public confidence that the government's capacity to
function as an open-minded decisionmaker will be maintained
despite the risk that partnership dynamics may result in adop-
tion of a quasi-entrepreneurial viewpoint and an unscrupulous
commitment to the project's completion.
V. PURPOSE
While there is likely to be little debate that government
action should be taken only when designed to advance public
purposes, competing concerns can influence how "public pur-
poses" should be defined and how that concept should be
implemented in particular circumstances. A number of "public
purposes" can be cited to support government participation in
cooperative ventures. A variety of planning objectives typically
provide the basic impetus for government involvement: a de-
sire to promote urban renewal or to stimulate the local econo-
my; a wish to provide needed government infrastructure, pub-
lic buildings, or amenities; and an interest in using incentives
in lieu of regulatory tools. Fiscal concerns are also likely to be
49. For example, the Rosemary Square project, described in Cheape v. Town
of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 359 S.E.2d 792 (1987), was legislatively authorized
in 1984, and reached the state supreme court in 1987. During and since that time
it was the subject of debate in two municipal elections and required several
changes in the project's design and the financing arrangements of the private
partner.
50. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3229 (duration), § 163.3234 (periodic review) (West
1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-130 (1988) (hearing requirements triggered by
amendment). See also Kessler, The Development Agreement and its Use in Resolving
Large Scale, Multi-Party Development Problems: A Look at the Tool and Suggestions for
its Application, 1 J. OF LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451 (1985).
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paramount, either in the form of a short term desire to avoid
public expenditures by marshaling private contributions, or in
the form of long term hopes for an enhanced tax base or
profit-sharing. However, each of these aspirations may trigger
countervailing concerns. Such concerns include anxiety that
government involvement may distort the market's operation to
the disadvantage of private participants, worry that govern-
ment may take questionable financial risks, and apprehension
that public health, safety, and welfare objectives may be sacri-
ficed to meet financial goals.
The existing legal framework allows the purpose of gov-
ernment action to be critically examined on a variety of fronts.
Statutes authorizing government action often specify the pur-
poses for which the stated authority may be used. Zoning stat-
utes and development agreement statutes are good exam-
ples."' Challenges to government action are frequently ad-
vanced on grounds that the purposes in question fail to com-
port with those provided by statute-a variation of the ultra
vires argument discussed in part I.52 In addition, government
action to further various illegal purposes may be forbidden by
statute .5  The existence of a public purpose is also typically
required by state constitutional provisions governing taxation,
borrowing, spending, and the exercise of the police power
consistent with due process and equal protection principles.54
51. See Standard Zoning Enabling Act § 4, supra note 34; CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65864; HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-121.
52. See, e.g., Housing Authority v. City of Los Augeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 243
P.2d 515 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952) (upholding agreement to vacate
streets in order to facilitate development of low rent housing in face of challenge
to government authority); Clark v. Marian Park, Inc., 80 III. App. 3d 1010, 400
"N.E.2d 661 (1980) (authority existed to address tax-exempt status in annexation
agreement); Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197,
172 A.2d 40 (1961), affid, 189 A.2d 226 (N.J. 1963) (per curiam) (township lacked
authority to enter into contingent zoning agreement requiring payment of money
for school construction purposes); City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 263 S.W.2d 528
(Tenn. 1953) (contract zoning was invalid when grant of land was involved in ex-
change for rezoning, because contract made for purpose of affecting official
conduct is ultra vires).
53. An example of such a prohibition is provided by federal statutes outlaw-
ing actions for anticompetitive ends. See Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape
Girardeau' 693 F.2d 733, 745 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983)
(discussing claim inder section 2 of the Sherman Act which prohibits conspiracies
to monopolize or attempt to monopolize).
54. See 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 41, § 100, at 304-05 (citing cases regarding
spending and borrowing for public purposes); 4 C. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, LOCAL
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Within these specific pockets of legal doctrine, courts have
developed several distinctive strategies for dealing with the sort
of problem presented by the existence of competing interests
such as those aforementioned. First, they have declared certain
purposes to be illegitimate. Examples of this approach include
judicial decisions declaring "financial zoning" to be illegal,55
and decisions by courts in a number of states prohibiting an-
nexation for the sole purpose of increasing municipal tax reve-
nues.5 6 Courts may or may not explain the reason for these
departures from the usual rule that deference is due to legisla-
tive judgments based upon legitimate purposes for public ac-
tion.57
Two other strategies for addressing the existence of com-
peting concerns have typically been used. Some courts balance
competing concerns and permit government action to proceed
if the benefits outweigh the risks. Cases involving restrictions
on the lending of public funds provide a ready illustration.
Some courts simply state that public concerns to foster a better
business climate can be furthered by the lending of public
resources, provided private interests are benefited only inci-
dentally and adequate provisions to protect against overreach-
ing or corruption are employed.5" Others probe more deeply
into the possibility that an adequate balance has been struck by
promoting the public good without unduly intruding into the
private marketplace and allocating public funds for private
objectives. These courts ask specifically whether private mar-
kets will be affected, and whether there exist any alternatives
to reliance upon public funds.59 Finally, courts may shift the
GOVERNMENT Lkw § 23.05 (1982) (discussing public purpose requirement applica-
ble to taxation).
55. See, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965) (striking down four-acre zoning restriction with comment that zoning "may
not be used . . . to avoid the increased responsibilities and economic burdens"
that growth inevitably brings).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Bellevue, Nebraska, 474 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.
1973); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. City of North Salt Lake, 711 P.2d 228 (Utah 1985);
2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 7.23a (3d rev. ed. 1988) (revenue raising may
not be sole purpose, but may be 'considered).
57. See Siemon, Public/Private Partnerships and Fundamental Fairness, in CITY
DEAL MAKING, 81-96 (Urban Land Institute, 1990).
58. See, e.g., Wilson v. Connecticut Product Dev. Corp., 167 Conn. 111, 355
A.2d 72 (1974) (upholding breeder industry loan program).
59. See, e.g., Stanley v. Department of Conservation and Dev., 284 N.C. 15,
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focus of discussion by accepting at face value the public pur-
poses advanced as justification for government action, yet re-
quiring that problematic effects which may result from pursuit
of such objectives be avoided. The exclusionary zoning case
law developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court exemplifies
this approach insofar as it acknowledges local governments'
interests in preserving community character, while requiring a
remedy for the denial of access to affordable housing that may
result.60
This basic framework provides a useful model for address-
ing the specific problems of purpose that arise in connection
with cooperative ventures. However, the applicability of the
basic framework is in need of clarification. For example, the
trial court decision in one of the few reported cases on cooper-
ative ventures, Municipal Art Society v. City of New York, 61 ap-
peared in part to turn upon the question of the city's purpose
in undertaking to sell city property near Central Park for the
development of a mixed-use project. The court objected to
contract provisions which in effect traded density bonuses for
cash that would be used to balance the city's budget rather
than to make local improvements near the project site.62 The
court's aversion to this strategy was plain enough, but its pre-
cise legal theory remained a bit obscure. The opinion hinted at
the possibility that the sale of density bonuses for such purpos-
es went beyond the scope of the governing ordinance. In addi-
tion, the court suggested that density bonuses may not be
proper "coinage" for some sorts of municipal transactions. 6,
199 S.E.2d 641 (1973) (striking down pollution bond program to benefit private
industry, prior to adoption of state constitutional amendment).
60. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel 1I, 92
N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1974), appeal dismissed ce)1. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975).
61. 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d.800 (1987). See also Babcock, supra note
3, at 948-55 (discussing in greater detail Municipal Art Society v. City of New
York's treatment of the question of the city's purpose in selling real property).
62. The city proposed that in return for expenditures for subway station im-
provements, the developer would be allowed to take advantage of an unusually
large "floor area ratio" (a 20 percent higher ratio between the square footage
allowable in a building and the square footage of the building lot than was other-
wise available). This increased development potential is in effect one form of
added density provided as a "bonus" for undertaking special development obliga-
tions.
63. See infra part VI.
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The opinion unfortunately did not explore in careful detail the
issues and strategies outlined above-whether raising revenues
by the sale of municipal assets is per se an invalid purpose,
whether that purpose improperly outweighed other legitimate
city purposes with regard to the project at hand, or whether
the adverse effects of a massive building on a sensitive site
were of primary concern.64
A clarification of the applicable legal framework would,
therefore, be beneficial. Government action taken purely for
profit may well compromise countervailing concerns such as
the protection of the public health and safety, and the avoid-
ance of undue financial risks. Nevertheless, declaring fiscal
purposes completely off limits would seem to provide a broad-
er remedy than is necessary to address these competing con-
cerns. Instead, a sufficiently strict legal framework might in-
clude the following elements: requiring an explicit acknowledg-
ment of government purposes in cooperative ventures, man-
dating that purposes other than profit-making be legitimate
and paramount, and ensuring protection against adverse ef-
fects upon public health and safety, the public treasury, and
private markets.
VI. GOVERNMENT COINAGE
A key element in any cooperative venture is the trading or
contribution by the parties of resources in order to further
their individual or joint interests. Private parties' resources are
generally well known and understood. Governments' resources
are a more complex amalgam of tangible assets (such as money
and rights with respect to land), and recognized powers (in-
cluding the powers to tax, borrow, condemn and regulate). For
purposes of this discussion, such resources may be described
as government "coinage."
Two major types of concerns must be taken into account
in determining the coinage allowable to the government in
cooperative ventures. First, the government should not im-
properly expropriate private resources for government use as a
result of its desire to garner excessive coinage. The basic tradi-
tion of protecting private expectations against government
overreaching is exceptionally strong. Second, the government's
64. 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1987).
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obligation to protect the public welfare should not be com-
promised, either through external co-option of its powers by
private interests, or by its own internal co-option resulting in
failure to treat that obligation as preeminent among compet-
ing claims. These dual concerns-to avoid government over-
reaching, and to prevent co-option of critical public inter-
ests-significantly limit the government coinage
that should be recognized.
The existing legal framework addresses these concerns
quite specifically both in rules that control the government's
acquisition of resources and in requirements that govern the
disposition of such resources. While these rules and require-
ments vary to some degree depending upon whether financial
resources or rights in land are involved, certain basic themes
are clear. Acquisition of resources is only allowed where public
purposes are served and safeguards against abuse of private
interests are established. Disposition of resources is even more
carefully controlled by various provisions designed to prevent
private abuse of the public interest, as well as by earmarking
government coinage in such a way as to limit potential clashes
between local governments' fiscal management and
welfare-protector roles.
Local governments' acquisition and disposition of funds
depends upon their exercise of three major powers-the power
to tax, the power to borrow, and the police power. The power
to tax, long feared, is strictly regulated. The ability of govern-
ments to acquire tax funds is limited by requirements that
adequate statutory authority be provided, by statutory and con-
stitutional restrictions on tax rates, and by more recently enact-
ed controls on tax assessment and tax levies.65 Expenditure of
such resources is also carefully constrained. Many states limit
local governments' ability to create coinage in the form of tax
breaks, that is, decisions to forego taxation. Requirements that
tax exemptions be authorized by state legislation ensure
65. See FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATION STATE REVENUE AND SPENDNG
LIMITATIONS SINCE PROPOSITION 13, at 7-8 (1980); I M. GEIFAND, STATE & LOCAL
GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING §§ 5.23-.36 (1985) (describing changes resulting
from recent tax revolt); Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integity
Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New Yor* City
Fiscal Crisis, The Taxpayers' Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REV. 545, 551-55
(1979).
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against local decisions to confer favored status on particular
individuals, thereby precluding co-option.66  Requirements
that government spending be statutorily authorized and serve a
public purpose provide similar protection.67 No additional
protection against ill-advised decisions to honor fiscal manage-
ment interests in derogation of more fundamental concerns
for the public health and welfare appears feasible in this con-
text, since budgeting and expenditure decisions concerning
finite resources necessarily involve tradeoffs of competing de-
mands.
The power to borrow is also carefully circumscribed. The
acquisition of funds by this method must be statutorily autho-
rized.68 General obligation bonds, to be repaid through fu-
ture tax revenues, are typically subject to referendum require-
ments and statutory or constitutional debt limitations.69 Reve-
nue bonds, to be repaid through project receipts, are inher-
ently limited by the absence of a public repayment obligation.
When significant burdens nonetheless arise, for example be-
cause of the ill-considered imposition of repayment obligations
upon utility ratepayers, rules concerning narrow construction
of authorizing legislation may be invoked to restrain
quasi-governmental abuse.7" The disposition of funds derived
from government borrowing has long been controlled by state
"antidonation" or "lending of credit" provisions designed spe-
cifically to preclude co-option of government borrowing pow-
ers by private interests. Interpretation of such provisions to
ensure that a clear and predominant public purpose exists and
that the potential for favoritism of particular private interests
is avoided effectively responds to this particular concern.71
66. See, 16 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.65 (3d rev. ed.
1984) (tax exemptions by municipalities must be authorized).
67. See 15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39.19 (3d rev. ed.
1985) (must be for a public municipal purpose); id. § 39.21 (illustrations of what
are and what are not public purposes).
68. See, e.g., 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 41, § 102, at 318-19 (collecting cases).
69. See id. §§ 100-01 (collecting cases on referendum requirements and debt
limitations).
70. See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 99
Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983) (invalidating elaborate financial agreements to
support construction of two nuclear generating plants, where participants were re-
quired to guarantee bond payments irrespective of whether plants were ever com-
pleted).
71. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Potential conflicts between competing governmental roles
are also addressed. Borrowing that involves a pledge of future
tax revenues must generally be approved through a public
referendum process that allows citizens to determine whether
potential risks to the public welfare are created by the pro-
posed expenditure of funds. Novel borrowing methods such as
tax increment financing allow the government to invest bor-
rowed funds in the hopes of realizing a return from future
appreciation in property values. Yet such a leveraging of bor-
rowing power is also carefully restricted: statutory authority is
generally needed; eligible projects are carefully defined; and
appreciation takes the form of incremental increases in future
tax payments which are in the first instance earmarked for
repayment of the start-up debt incurred.72 Stringent controls
also limit the adverse effects on the public that might arise
from use of revenue bonds. With the growing realization that
federal tax breaks and lower interest costs are a significant
portion of the value of revenue bonds and affect the resulting
operation of the bond market, Congress has imposed restric-
tions on their use designed to earmark these benefits and con-
trol potential government abuse. Recent amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code thus restrict the purposes for which
revenue bond-related tax breaks will be afforded, and impose
arbitrage penalties73 and state volume caps. 4
A third governmental power, the police power,75 has also
been used in recent years to accumulate government funds in
the form of in lieu and impact fees. 6 The acquisition of such
72. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 46-101 to -113 (1985 & Stpp. 1987).
73. Arbitrage penalties can be imposed in the event governments borrow
funds for specific purposes at low interest rates reflecting the special status of
municipal borrowings, but retain and invest those funds for the unrelated purpose
of accruing additional earnings. Section 148 of the Internal Revenue Code pro-
ides that issuers of tax exempt bonds are required to rebate to the U.S. Treasury
all arbitrage earnings on investments unrelated to the governmental purpose of
borrowing. I.R.C. § 148 (1988).
74. See I.R.C. § 146 (1988) (imposing state-wide volume caps on private
activity bonds used for various purposes).
75. The police power is the government's power to take steps necessary in
the interest of the public health, safety and welfare. The police power is regarded
as an inherent power of state governments andi is afforded local governments
through authorizing legislation or home rule provisions.
76. Impact fees, or development fees, are charges that local governments levy
"against new development ... to generate revenue for capital ftnding necessitat-
ed by the new developoment." See Jurgensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer
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funds must be statutorily authorized, however, and must rest
upon demonstrable needs for public infrastructure and open
space that are associated with land development activities pro-
posed by individual property owners." In most jurisdictions,
funds collected on that basis must then be spent to benefit the
development proposed by the location of facilities relatively
nearby, in some states within a specific time period.7" Failure
to comply with these requirements may mean that a levy is
deemed a tax.79
Government acquisition and disposition of rights with
respect to land is also dependent upon the exercise of particu-
lar governmental powers. The exercise of those powers is like-
wise carefully constrained in light of the competing concerns
outlined above. Rights to land can be acquired with funds
derived through taxation, borrowing, or the police power. Ac-
quisition of land for public purposes is often freely authorized
by statute as a necessary incident of a local government's cor-
porate existence.8 ° Moreover, few protections against govern-
ment overreaching are required, since private parties who sell
land can protect their own interests through the bargaining
process. Additionally, the government's impact as a market
participant which is denied opportunities for speculative invest-
ment"' is generally benign. However, the disposition of real
estate assets is more closely controlled. Each sale must be au-
to Local Government's Capital Funding Dilema, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 417 (1981).
77. See generally Bosselnan & Stroud, Mandatoiy Tithes: The Legality of Land
Development Linkage, 9 NOVA L.J. 381 (1985); Wegner, supra note 14, at 1014-20.
78. See, e.g., Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817,
379 A.2d 200, 204 (1977) (benefit to development must result from exaction);
Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinnellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So.
2d 314 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979) (earmarking of funds required
for impact fees).
79. See, e.g., Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (unless ra-
tional nexus text applicable to exactions is satisfied, impact fee may constitute
illegal tax arbitrarily imposed on the few for the benefit of the many).
80. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-240.1 (1987) (power to acquire prop-
erty).
81. See 10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 28.11 (3d rev. ed. 1981) (discussing
purchase of property for municipal purposes, and citing cases holding purchase
for speculation or profit was not a public purpose); 12 E. MCQUI.LIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 36.03-.05 (3d rev. ed. 1981) (collecting cases supporting proposi-
tion that municipality may not ordinarily engage in purchase of land for real
estate speculation since such activity is not generally deemed to be included in
those authorized by statutes).
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thorized, and, if property was acquired through dedication or
gift, can be constrained by the terms of the initial grant be-
cause the government is deemed to act in a fiduciary capacity
with regard to such assets.82 Certain special types of rights in
land are further protected by the operation of the public trust
doctrine, which allows courts to set aside attempted transfers
of rights affecting navigable waters." This doctrine is perhaps
due in part to the possible private cooption of government
action, or implicitly erroneous government judgments setting
the goal of financial gain ahead of the historically important
need to preserve avenues for trade.
Rights to land may also be acquired through use of the
government's eminent domain power. The acquisition of land
by this means is explicitly addressed in both federal and state
constitutions.8 4 Such provisions typically require that "just
compensation" be paid, thereby providing some measure of
protection for private expectations.8 5 They also refer to the
government's taking of property to serve a "public use." Al-
though once viewed narrowly as requiring land taken to be put
to use by the government, a broader view now prevails, at least
under the federal Constitution, that the eminent domain pow-
er can be used for any proper public purpose.86 Greater flexi-
bility has also been attained with regard to government dispo-
sition of property acquired through exercise of the eminent
domain power. For example, transfer of land to private parties
is permitted where doing so would advance government objec-
tives, as in the promotion of urban renewal.87 Restrictions
82. See 10 McQUILLIN, SUPRA NOTE 37, §§ 28.37-.40 (3d rev. ed. 1981) (dis-
cussing need for legislative authority at least where property is devoted to public
use); id. § 28.52a (discussing restrictions on use and sale of parkland acquired by
grant).
83. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Prope ty and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public
Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV..631 (1986).
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just coinpensation"); Stoebuck, Suburban Land Banking, 1986 U. ILL.
L. REV. 581, 594-95 (1986) (discussing availability of state constitutional provisions
providing more extensive protection than the federal constitution).
85. See 3 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.1 (3(1 rev. ed. 1985).
86. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding
Hawaii land reform legislation that created mechanism for condemning land held
by large landowners and transferring ownership of condemned fee simple title to
existing lessees or others, as consistent with constitutional "public use" provision).
87. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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nevertheless exist respecting such government action in the
form of statutory provisions elaborately detailing requirements
associated with the exercise of eminent domain. Courts have
also curbed potential risks and abuses associated with the exer-
cise of this power. In a famous case involving construction of
the World Trade Center, Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New
York Authority,88 New York City was found to lack authority to
condemn property for use as a source of rental income to be
derived from retail tenants unrelated to the World Trade Cen-
ter concept.89 Similarly, questions may arise as to the legality
of government landbanking based on the exercise of eminent
domain power, unless government objectives include more
than a mere desire to speculate in hopes of real estate appreci-
ation. Moreover, the anticipated transfer at a future date must
serve discernible purposes and occur within a reasonable
time. 90
The police power in recent years has increasingly become
a crucial vehicle for the government to acquire new coinage in
the form of regulatory rights with respect to land. In effect,
the imposition of regulatory requirements which preclude vari-
ous types of private activity constitute public servitudes not
unlike certain types of traditional easements and equitable
restraints. Federal and state constitutional provisions that re-
quire compliance with due process and equal protection
principles and mandate the avoidance of regulatory taking
provide some basic safeguards against government overreach-
ing. On the other hand, however, the "reserved rights" doc-
trine serves to protect the public interest against possible
co-option. Under that doctrine, a local government cannot
"contract away" its police power, but must retain the right to
modify regulatory requirements as needed to respond to im-
portant public health and safety concerns. It may not waive
that right in return for private concessions, at least where not
explicitly authorized by statute, and where private expectations
to the contrary are unfounded or ill-defined.9
88. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402 (1963).
89. Id.
90. See Stoebuck, supra note 84, at 603-05 (collecting sparse case law).
91. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); Brick Presbyterian Church v.
New York, 5 Cow. 538, 540 (N.Y. 1826). See generally Wegner, supra note 14, at
965-68.
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In recent years, governments have begun to experiment
with ways in which new coinage might be minted that is consis-
tent with these basic restrictions on the exercise of the
government's police power. They have met with some success
in at least two situations-where vested rights have been recog-
nized pursuant to development agreement statutes, and where
transferable development rights have been created to facilitate
achievement of historic preservation and environmental pro-
tection objectives.
Development agreement statutes have created new vested
rights coinage that affords developers a longer period of pro-
tection against regulatory modification of major projects than
might be provided by common law rule.9" Such added coin-
age is only created at a developer's request, however, thereby
avoiding potential governmental overreaching. Moreover, the
public interest is protected through statutory limitations and
explicit agreement provisions on the duration and nature of
the regulatory freeze that will be put into effect. Finally, ear-
marked benefits to the public are typically included either in
the form of contributions to infrastructure or funds designated
to serve a particular community objective. Transferable devel-
opment rights have also been designed to address concerns
regarding governments' overreaching or cooption. Under this
approach, development rights in particular parcels of land are
92. Common law rules typically blend estoppel and vested rights theories. Es-
toppel may apply when a property owner, relying in good faith upon some act or
omission of the government, has made such a substantial change in position or in-
curred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be inequitable and
unjust to destroy the rights which he ostensibly has acquired. A vested right to
complete construction of a specific development project may be created when a
landowner obtains or is the beneficiary of an affirmaive governmental act allowing
development of a specific project, relies in good faith upon the affirmative gov-
ernmental act, and makes a substantial change in position or incurs extensive
obligations or expenses in the furtherance of the specific project in accordance
with the affirmative governmental act. See C. SIEMON, W. Il\RSON & D. PORTER,
VESTED RIGHTS--BAIANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS
(Urban Land Institute 1982); Hanes & Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and
Development, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373 (1989); Heeter, Zoning Estoppel" Ap-
plication of the Ptinciples of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 15
URB. L. ANN. 63 (1971). For a discussion of development agreements, see Wegner,
supra note 14, at 994-1038; MANAGING DEVELOPMENT THROUGII PUBLIC/PRIVATE
NEGOTIATIONS (R. Levitt & J. Kirlin ed. 1985); D. PORTER & L. MARSH, DEVEL-
OPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY AND PROSPECTS (Urban L.and Institute
1989).
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bifurcated. A certain level or type of development is allowed to
occur on the original parcel, yet additional rights to height or
density of development are severed and relocated else-
where." In effect, the government creates an additional servi-
tude or recaptures certain development rights in connection
with a particularly sensitive parcel.
However, the property owner's rights are protected inso-
far as the Constitution's taking restrictions continue to oper-
ate, and insofar as he or she, rather than the government,
receives the financial value of the severed rights once they
have been acquired by the owner of a designated receiving
parcel. The public's interest in protection against cooption of
the local government's welfare-protection function is also
served. Designation of areas to serve as recipient parcels gener-
ally occurs with ample public debate at the same time protect-
ed areas are identified. Moreover, the government has no insti-
tutional financial stake of its own in the rights created, and
instead serves merely as an honest broker which facilitates the
operation of a trading system that it has created itself.
In sum, a complex legal framework has already been creat-
ed that significantly shapes the government coinage available
for use in cooperative ventures to protect citizens against gov-
ernment overreaching and to prevent cooption of the
government's role as protector of the public health and wel-
fare. This framework should therefore allay fears concerning
potential conflicts of interest in settings where the government
coinage to be employed is well-established and understood.
Novel situations are likely to arise, however, particularly in the
context of government efforts to capitalize on its police power.
The decision in Municipal Art Society94 provides a ready exam-
ple. In that case, the government sought to transfer land previ-
ously acquired and to trade density bonuses for additional
funds ultimately used for purposes unrelated to the project
area. Problems existed both as to the acquisition and disposi-
93. See generally, Delaney, Kominers & Gordon, TDR Redux: A Second Gener-
ation of Practical Legal Concerns, 15 URB. LAW. 593 (1983). See also Schnidman &
Roberts, Municipal Air Rights: New York City's Proposal to Sell Air Rights Over Public
Buildings and Public Spaces, 15 URB. LAW. 347 (1983) (discussing proposal to allow
city to sell air rights as means of generating revenue and managing development).
94. 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1987), discussed supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
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tion of the density bonuses (a form of police power coinage).
Although ordinance provisions allowed for the use of density
bonuses in somewhat general terms, some doubt existed as to
whether there had been a conscious authorization of their use
on a massive scale.95 Even more importantly, the trade of the
large density bonus for undesignated funds, rather than the
earmarking of compensation for use on local improvements,
opened the way for cooption of the government's judgment in
its role as protector of the public welfare. 6 Accordingly, the
trial court invalidated the arrangement.
The fundamental lessons to be learned concerning avail-
able government coinage are therefore short and sweet. Under
existing law, governments are unable to create coinage in dero-
gation of established private interests. Nor may such coinage,
once acquired, be spent in ways that excessively benefit private
interests, compromise the public welfare, or result in excessive
financial speculation by local governments. Nonetheless, within
these strictures, there exists substantial coinage to allow fruitful
cooperation in public-private ventures.
VII. NONCOMPLIANCE
Public and private interests must converge in order to give
rise to a cooperative venture agreement. At some later date,
however, they may diverge, giving rise to noncompliance by
either a public or private party. At that point, competing inter-
ests clearly exist on at least two scores. First, the parties dis-
agree on the continued viability of their agreement or its
terms. The nonperforming party seeks to avoid old obligations
in order to pursue new or more compelling objectives, while
the other party continues to adhere to its earlier expectations
and desires that contractual obligations be honored. The par-
ties are also likely to be in disagreement over the remedies
available in the event of noncompliance. The nonperforming
party generally wants to limit its financial exposure and move
on, and accordingly prefers a remedy that will cut short any
ongoing losses and keep any damage award at a minimum.
The injured party, on the other hand, would rather proceed
with the deal and desires a more substantial remedy to serve as
95. See Lassar, Zoning for Sale, URB. LAND 34-35 (March 1988).
96. 137 Misc. 2d at 835-36, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 803-04.
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a disincentive to noncompliance.
The existing legal framework that governs nonperfor-
mance of private-sector contracts has been developed to ad-
dress these sorts of competing interests. For current purposes,
it is enough to say that basic- contract principles relating to
nonperformance and remedies apply to most agreements in-
volving local governments. 97
These basic principles may themselves be insufficient to
ease all worries where cooperative ventures are concerned, be-
cause they fail to take into account the special character of
government action in this context. Governments which enter
into cooperative ventures may be more risk averse than their
private partners and more risk averse than they would be in
other settings. They may face particularly significant financial
exposure, and may find it especially problematic to maintain
their part of a bargain in the face of competing and relatively
inflexible financial burdens. The government may also find it
difficult to shore up a floundering partner who seeks infusion
of additional resources or concessions with regard to otherwise
applicable rules. Moreover, government partners must also
weather potential political squalls associated with major pro-
jects that rarely command universal support, and must main-
tain the integrity of their functioning in the welfare-protector
role,98 as well as the role of entrepreneur and partner. These
realities may give rise to government noncompliance or influ-
ence government action should private noncompliance occur.
97. See 10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 37, at § 29.02 (3d rev. ed. 1981) (rules re-
lating to contracts generally apply to agreements to which a municipal corporation
is a party); id. § 29.05 (power to contract depends upon usual rules regarding
municipal power). Applicable principles include those which govern other sorts of
agreements. See id. § 29.02 ("there must be an offer and acceptance, mutuality,
delivery, where that is an essential element of the particular transaction, and in
general a conformance with all requirements of the law of contracts"). The
agreement also requires consideration, which may consist of mutual, implied, or
conditional promises or the release or settlement of a claim. Id. § 29.05 ("Where
a city contracts in its proprietary, as distinguished from its governmental, capacity,
its measure of liability under the agreement is the same as that of a private
individual or corporation tinder like conditions." The power to contract must exist
at the time the contract is made, as any restrictions on the power to contract are
designed to protect the public).
98. Local governments must exercise their responsibilities under the police
power to make decisions on the applicability of regulatory restrictions designed to
protect the public health, safety and welfare, even with regard to projects in which
the government is itself involved.
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Finally, local governments are subject to special legal obliga-
tions concerning impairment of contracts that do not govern
the conduct of private partners. Although the federal
Constitution's Contracts Clause9" is not implicated by mere
breaches of government contracts in the event that adequate
remedies are provided, the Contracts Clause may be triggered
by government efforts to modify contractual provisions of
public-private contracts. It may be triggered absent adequate
justification in the form of changed circumstances, unforesee-
able events and public necessity sufficient to dictate a decision
to override established expectations pursuant to the police
power.'00 Absent such justification and alternative remedies,
governments may be called upon to specifically perform con-
tractual obligations.'
0
'
Several additional steps may be taken by government par-
ties to address special circumstances that make reliance upon
traditional contract principles to resolve competing interests
more difficult where noncompliance with cooperative venture
obligations is concerned. Clear standards for defining obliga-
tions and measuring compliance are especially important to
provide an adequate benchmark in the event of financial or
political downturns. 0 2 An effort should be made to antici-
pate future problems or changes in circumstances in order to
specify at the outset that both current and future public health
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.").
100. See United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977) (invalidating New Jersey decision to shift bond revenues, which had origi-
nally been restricted in order to provide security to bond holders, to use in
improving public transportation system; although state had legitimate interest in
improving public transit, need for such improvements had been foreseeable and
did not outweigh substantial private expectations, and thus violated the Contracts
Clause). See generally Wegner, supra note 14, at 968-77.
101. See Note, Takings Law and the Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to
Legislative Modifications of Public Contracts, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1462-63 (1984).
102. See, e.g., Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 359 S.E.2d 792
(1987) (setting forth local legislation authorizing Rosemary Square project, includ-
ing provisions requiring that the cooperative venture contract assure that public
facilities meet the needs of the Town and be constructed at a reasonable price).
The clear standards provided in the legislation in this case were helpful in resolv-
ing litigation brought by disgruntled neighbors of the proposed project. The
project itself ultimately foundered due to the changing real estate market and the
financial difficulties of the developers, following local elections in which the con-
tinuation of the joint undertaking was a hotly-debated issue and in which the
composition of the local town council changed in significant respects.
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and welfare concerns will be addressed. Finally, ample reme-
dies for noncompliance should be included in the interest of
both parties, perhaps including clauses that appropriate perfor-
mance bonds'03 would be provided by the private partner
and liquidated damages provisions0 4 would be applicable to
the public partner. These remedies would ensure that govern-
ment judgment remains free and independent in the event of
noncompliance and that private expectations are fairly treated
in the event of changing political tides.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This essay has attempted to advance the understanding of
potential conflicts of interest raised by cooperative ventures. It
has argued that competing concerns must be precisely identi-
fied and delineated before a determination can be made as to
whether insurmountable conflicts exist. It has suggested that
such competing concerns are evident with regard to several
distinct aspects of cooperative ventures, and that each such
aspect must be separately examined and analyzed if appropri-
ate means for mediating or avoiding conflicts are to be devel-
oped. Finally, it has explored six specific aspects of cooperative
ventures-government capacity, parties, process, purposes,
government coinage, and noncompliance problems-to deter-
mine how the existing legal framework addresses potentially
conflicting interests and how that legal framework can be sup-
plemented or modified to be more effective. However, devel-
opment of an adequate legal framework is only one part of the
picture. The insight, integrity and ingenuity of local govern-
ment officials, professional staffs, and the development com-
munity remain the key ingredients in ensuring that the great
promise of cooperation without conflicts in public-private ven-
tures becomes a reality.
103. Performance bonds provide a form of security that ensures that a
third-party guarantor will provide necessary funds to complete obligations under-
taken by a developer, should default on those obligations occur before the com-
pletion of the project.
104. Liquidated damages provisions could be tsed to ensure that the parties
agree on the extent of damages that would be incurred in the event of a breach
by the public party.

